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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE B. PECK, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
vs. ; 
DONALD J. PECK, J 
1 CASE NO. 20057 
Defendant-Appellant, ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding 
over 90% of the marital property to the wife/ where the 
parties had substantially similar earning power and had made 
substantially similar contributions to the acquisition of the 
marital assests? 
2. Was it reversible error for the trial court to 
fail to make any finding as to the earning power of each of 
the parties? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce. After a trial before 
the Honorable Boyd Bunnell on April 19/ 1984/ the trial court 
granted a divorce to the plaintiff-respondant (wife)/ and 
awarded her $10/000,00 as alimony and over 90% of the marital 
assets as a property award. The defendant-appellant 
(husband) thereafter perfected this appeal from the property 
division only. A copy of the trial court's findings of fact 
and conclusions of the law is attached hereto as Appendix 
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"A". A copy of the decree of divorce is attached as 
Appendix "B". 
The plaintiff and defendant were married September 16/ 
1950. Of the children born to the marriage/ four were still 
living at the time of the divorce, and each had obtained the 
age of majority and each was self-supporting. 
During the past few years the husband has had to live away 
from home for extended periods of time to pursue his work as an 
electrical power line contractor. The wife filed this action 
for divorce on January 6/ 1984. (R. 1-4) The husband also 
counterclaimed for divorce. (R. 11-12) The husband elected 
to abandon his counterclaim at the trial and did not rebut 
or cross-examine the wife's testimony as to the grounds for 
divorce. The trial court granted a divorce to the wife based 
on mental cruelty. (R. 81/ 88) The granting of the divorce 
to the wife is not challenged by this appeal. (R. 95) 
Shortly after the complaint was filed/ the wife sought 
and obtained an order requiring the husband to pay temporary 
alimony to the wife in the amount of $1/500.00 per month/ and 
prohibiting the husband from disposing of any of the business 
assets without consent of the wife. (R. 13) The husband 
was not present at the hearing (Tr. 115)/ and moved/ through nev 
counsel/ for a re-hearing on the temporary order/ and affirm-
atively sought to have the wife restrained from interfering 
with the operation of the husband's business. (R. 22-23) 
On stipulation of the parties/ the court entered an order 
restraining the wife from interfering with the husband's business 
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The issue of temporary support was reserved for trial. After 
the trial/ the court suspended all except $1/500.00 of 
the temporary alimony/ and ordered the husband to pay future 
alimony of $10,000.00/ payable $2,000.00 per year. (R. 91-92) 
The orders/ judgment and decree with respect to temporary 
and permanent alimony are not challenged by this appeal. 
This appeal challenges the trial court's divison of the 
marital assets. The parties owned two business/ Peck's Plants 
and Diana/ Inc./ and in addition owned substantial real 
and personal property. Diana/ Inc./ was the corporation 
through which the husband operated his business as an electrical 
power line contractor. (Tr. 120) Peck's Plants/ a greenhouse/ 
was operated primarily by the wife. The parties had historically 
used the income from Diana, Inc., for living expenses, and the 
income from Pecks Plants for investments. (Tr. 35.). 
The evidence concerning Diana, Inc., indicated that, al-
though historically had been a profitable business, it had a 
negative net worth at the time of trial. Of the two line trucks 
used in the business, one had been repossessed and the other 
had been transferred to the Peck's son. (Tr. 127) Much of the 
other capital equipment had been°stolen. (Tr. 155-57, 173) With 
no line trucks/ and having lost much of the other equipment/ 
Diana, Inc. could no longer contract for large projects as it 
had in the past. (Tr. 127/ 165-66) Mr. Peck had been able to 
secure one job with Parowan City, where the city allowed him 
to borrow its line truck/ but had not been able to locate any 
other work within the capabilities of Diana; Inc. (Tr. 127/ 
152) Mr. Peck testified that the net worth of Diana, Inc., at 
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the time of trial was a negative $50/400.00. (Ex. 16/ Tr. 121-
22) Although the wife tried to discredit this testimony/ she 
offered no other testimony concerning the net worth/ at the 
time of trial/ of Diana, Inc. 
Peck's Plants had in the last few years demonstrated an 
income potential of approximately $15/000.00 to $20/000.00 per 
year. (Tr. 91) Peck's plants also suffered from the need for 
capital improvements. There was testimony that some of the 
small enclosures needed repair/ and that it would cost approx-
imately $1/200.00 to perform the repairs. (Tr. 27) There was 
also testimony that Peck's Plants had not been able to purchase 
the necessary inventory/ and at the time of trial had only 
$4,500.00 in inventory, in contrast with $31,000.00 in 
inventory the previous year. (Tr. 109) 
The testimony concerning the value of the real and personal 
property of the parties was conflicting. The wife's witness 
as to the value of the real property was Mr. James Bartorelli, 
a title researcher and real estate salesman. (Tr. 7) The 
husband testified as to the value on his own behalf. The major 
items of property were the parties' home, the Swasey property, 
the Miller Creek property, Peck's Plants, Diana, Inc., and 
the cars and trucks. 
The parties' home consisted of a 1744 square foot house 
on a little less than an acre of ground, together with the 
greenhouses. (Ex. 7, Tr. 10) In addition, there was a 
fifty foot strip of property on the north (Rowley property) 
and another parcel of property of approximately one-half 
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acre on the south of the home (state property). Mr. Bartorelli 
testified that the home/ greenhouse/ and land was worth only 
$68,500.00/ due to a very depressed market. (Tr. 11-12) The 
Bartorelli figure included the Rowley property but did not 
include the state property. (Tr. 10-11) Mr. Bartorelli did 
not have any estimate as to the value of the state property. 
Mr. Peck testified that the home property was worth $100/000.00 
and that the state property was worth $40/000.00. (Ex. 17/ 
Tr. 124) Mrs. Peck testified that the Rowley property had 
been purchased for $7/500.00. (Tr. 113) There was a mortgage 
against the home of approximately $26/000.00/ leaving an 
equity of approximately $42/588.00 according to the Bartorelli 
figures/ and approximately $122/000.00 according to Mr. 
Peck's figure. 
The Swasey property consisted of approximately 56.63 
acres of development property. The Peck's owned only a 58% 
interest in the property; the remaining 42% was owned by Mr. 
Garn Anderson/ a banker. (Tr. 36) Twenty acres of the 
original 56.63 acres had been sold to Mike Dimitric and 
another on contract for $4/000.00 an acre. (Tr. 37) The re-
maining balance due on the Dimitric contract was approximately 
$51,000.00 payable $9/000.00 per year. (Tr. 37) Mr. 
Bartorelli testified that the 56.63 acres had a fair market 
value of $42,200.00. (Ex. 7) Mr. Bartorelli did not take 
into account the fact that 20 acres of the parcel had 
already been sold for $80/000.00. Mr. Bartorelli also did 
not make any separate assessment of the property owned by 
the Pecks as opposed to that which had been sold on contract 
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to Mr. Dimitric. (Ex. 7) Mrs. Peck testified that she 
would not sell the properties for anything close to the low 
values placed on the property by Mr. Bartorelli. (Tr. 96) 
Mr. Peck testified that the portion of the Swasey Property 
retained by the Pecks was worth approximately $100/000.00. 
(Ex. 17/ Tr. 124) There was a mortgage against the Swasey 
property of approximately $18/560.00. (Ex. 8) 
The Miller Creek property consisted of 17 acres of 
development property which was purchased for $3/000.00 per 
acre, or $51/000.00. (Tr. 32) Mr. Bartorelli testified 
that the current depressed value of the property was $13/000.00, 
(Ex. 7) Mr. Peck testified that the property was worth 
$48/000.00. (Ex. 17/ Tr. 124) There was a mortgage against 
the property of $36/800.00 (Ex. 8)/ leaving a negative 
equity of $23/800.00 according to the Bartorelli figures, 
and a positive equity of $11/200.00 according to Mr. Peck's 
figures. 
The parties owned a 1983 Cadillac automobile/ which 
Mrs. Peck testified had a current value of approximately 
$14/000.00. (Tr. 45) There was a lien against the Cadillac 
for the sum of $9/000.00 (Tr. 45), leaving an equity of 
$5,000.00. 
The 1977 Chevrolet one-ton dump truck was used by Mrs. 
Peck in her business. (Tr. 31) Mrs. Peck testified the 
truck had a value of $2,500.00 to $3,000.00. (Tr. 30-31) 
Mr. Peck testified that the value was $2,000.00 (Ex. 17, Tr. 
124) 
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The 1979 GMC Jimmy had a value/ according to Mr. Peck/ 
of $3/500.00. (Ex. 17/ Tr. 124) Mrs. Peck did not have any 
testimony as to the value of the 1979 GMC Jimmy. 
The parties also owned various items of personal property 
including a decanter collection/ certain antique furniture/ 
a carved kitchen chair and a bronze coal miner. Mr. Peck 
testified that the decanter was worth $4/000.00; the old 
furniture/ $500.00; the carved kitchen chair/ $200.00; and 
the bronze coal miner/ $3/500.00; all other bronzes/ 
$27,000.00; all other antiques, $25/000.00; all other house-
hold goods, $15/000.00. (Ex. 17, Tr. 124) Mrs. Peck did 
not testify concerning the value of these items. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court took the 
matter under advisement, and subsequently awarded Mr. Peck 
the 1979 GMC Jimmy, the personal property in his possession, 
and Diana, Inc. All other real and personal property was 
awarded to Mrs. Peck. (R. 88-92) Mr. Peck thereafter perfected 
this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In dividing the marital property, the trial court is 
required to make an equitable division of the property. 
There should be no punitive element in a division of property. 
The trial Court's division will be affirmed on appeal unless 
there was an abuse of descretion. In the instant matter, it 
is evident that the trial court did abuse its descretion. 
Although the evidence concerning the value of the marital 
property was sharply in conflict, even using those figures 
most favorable to the wife it is evident that the wife 
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received well over 90% of the marital property. Prior 
decisions of this court have established that such a 
lopsided award constitutes an abuse of discretion, and 
the decree in this case should be modified or 
reversed. 
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that the trial court specifically find each 
material fact in issue. In a divorce proceeding, this 
includes specific findings as to the current income of 
each of the parties, and should also include 
sufficient findings as to the value of the properties 
such as will enable an appellate court to make a 
considered review of the matter. The trial court in 
this matter failed to make any findings concerning the 
current income of either of the parties. As an 
alternative to a reversal of the trial court*s decree, 
therefore, this matter should be remanded with 
instructions to the trial court to enter specific 
findings of fact. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AWARD OF OVER 90% OF THE MARITAL ASSETS 
TO THE WIFE CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRE-
TION. 
In dividing the marital property, the trial court 
is instructed and empowered to "make such orders in 
relation to the . . . property . . . as may be 
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equitable." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1984). An 
equitable division should result in an approximately 
equal division of the property. Clausen v. Clausen, 
675 P.2d 562, 565 (Utah 1983). 
Although no formula can be set which will govern 
all cases, this court has often set forth a list of 
various factors that may be considered: 
They include: the respective ages of the 
parties; what each may have given up for the 
marriage; what money or property each 
put into the marriage; the physical and 
mental health of the parties; the relative 
ability, training and education of the 
parties; the duration of the marriage; the 
present income of the parties; the efforts 
exerted by the parties in acquiring marital 
property; the present mental and physical 
age of the parties; the ability of the wife 
to provide income for herself; and the 
ability of the husband to provide support. 
Turner v. Turner. 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982). The 
evidence indicated that the parties were approximately 
equal with respect to each of these factors. 
Notwithstanding the parties' relative equality 
with respect to each of these factors, the trial 
court's award of property was grossly biased in favor 
of the wife. The trial court did not make any 
findings as to the value of the various items of 
property, and it is therefore impossible to obtain a 
true picture of the extent of the disproportionality 
of the decree. Even viewing all the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the wife, however, the 
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disproportionate nature of the division is 
evident. The wife offered no testimony as to the value 
of the household furniture and bronze and antique 
items, but the husband testified that they were valued 
at least $75,000.00. The wife was also awarded the 
Swasey property, together with any interest in the 
Dimitric contract. Although the wife's appraiser 
testified that the value of the entire Swasey property 
was $42,200.00, the court did not make any finding as 
to what portion of the value attached to the property 
retained by the Pecks as opposed to that sold to 
Dimitric. It was undisputed that the face value of 
the contract to Dimitric was $51,000.00 and the Pecks 
58% share of that contract would be $29,580.00. The 
mortgage against the Swasey property was $18,560.00. 
It is therefore evident that the equity awarded to the 
wife is in the $20,000.00 to $30,000.00 range. 
The defendant, on the other hand, was awarded a 
1979 GMC Jimmy, which, although it had a value of 
$3,500.00, was subject to an $8,000.00 debt (Tr.46), 
and was also awarded Diana, Inc. The only competent 
evidence as to the value of Diana, Inc., was that of 
Mr. Peck, who testified that it had a negative net 
worth $50,400.00. The wife attempted to discredit 
this testimony by showing that the corporation had 
made money in the past, but offered no evidence as to 
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the current earning power of the corporation. 
Mr. Peck testified that the corporate assets had 
been depleted, and that there was little or no 
possibility that the corporation would be able to earn 
money as it had in the past without a substantial 
influx of capital. (Tr. 127, 165-66) 
Even viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the wife, therefore, it is evident that 
the wife was awarded property with a total value of at 
least $130,000.00 or more, while the husband was 
awarded property with a negative value of 
approximately $60,000.00. Although the defendant-
husband acknowledges that the trial court is vested 
with a considerable latitude of discretion, that 
discretion is not without bounds, and a trial court's 
award will be reversed where there was an abuse of 
discretion. "An abuse of discretion is manifested by 
a substantially inequitable division of the marital 
estate." Holston v. Holston, 668 P.2d 1048, 1051 
(Mont. 1983). 
The only rationale that can be conceived for the 
trial court's award of property in this matter is that 
the trial court was attempting to impose some 
punishment on Mr. Peck for his allegedly culpable 
conduct leading to the divorce. A case very similar 
to the instant matter in that respect is Read v. Read, 
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594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979). The court in that case 
stated as follows: 
In the case before us it appears that 
the trial court's property award may reflect 
a degree of punishment against the defendant 
for his extra marital conduct and relative 
"guilt" in bringing about the dissolution of 
the marriage. A trial court must consider 
many factors in making a property settlement 
in a divorce proceeding, but the purpose of 
the settlement should not be to impose 
punishment upon either party. In Wilson 
v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 
(1956), we stated the law with respect 
to this issue: 
In regard to the defendant's 
contention that the judgment 
represents an effort of the court 
to impose a punishment upon him: 
We recognize that there is no 
authority in our law for 
administering punitive measures 
in a divorce judgment, and that 
to do so would be improper, except 
that the court may, and as a 
practical matter invariably does, 
consider the relative loyalty or 
disloyalty of the parties to their 
marriage vows, and their relative 
guilt or innocence in causing the 
breakup of the marriage. It is to 
be recognized that it is seldom, 
perhaps never, that there is any 
wholly guilty or wholly innocent 
party to a divorce action. The 
trial court was aware, of course, 
that when people are well adjusted 
and happy in marriage, one of them 
does not just out of a clear blue 
sky fall in love with someone 
else; and that when this occurs it 
is usually an indication that the 
marriage has disintegrated from 
other causes. 
594 P.2d at 872 (footnote omitted). 
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In the Read case, the parties had been married 
for 25 years, had several family businesses, and 
substantial other assets. The trial court awarded the 
defendant approximately 90% of the assets, and this 
court reversed, stating that flthe property award in 
this case is far too disparate." 594 P.2d at 872. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY 
FIND THE VALUES OF THE PROPERTY AND THE 
EARNING CAPABILITIES OF THE PARTIES 
CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that the court, in actions tried without a 
jury, "shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusion of law thereon . . . . fl 
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-4 (1984) requires 
that " [t]he court in all divorce cases shall make and 
file its findings and decree upon the evidence." The 
court is required to make findings upon all material 
issues. Boyer Co. v. Lianell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 
1977). The requirement that the trial court make 
specific findings of fact is mandatory, and may not be 
waived. Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, N.A, 
611 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah 1980). The failure of the 
trial court to make findings on all material issues is 
reversible error. Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1339 (Utah 1979). 
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Findings of fact in a divorce action serve two 
important functions. The first function is to enable 
the reviewing court to properly exercise its 
responsibilities: 
Rational decision making by the trial court 
requires that the court address and resolve 
all pertinent subordinate and ultimate 
factual issues which must be resolved on the 
basis of the evidence presented and the 
applicable rules of law. This process is 
even more important to the proper function 
of a reviewing court. Appellate courts 
simply are not in a position to evaluate 
and resolve conflicting oral testimony as 
accurately as a trial court. The failure of 
the trial court to make findings of fact is 
not only reviewable, but it is also 
reversible error. 
Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 
392, 395 (Utah 1980); See also Rucker v. Dalton, 598 
P.2d 1336, 1338-39 (Utah 1979). 
In light of this rule, the prejudicial nature of 
the trial court's failure to make specific findings of 
fact in this matter is readily apparent. In order 
to demonstrate that the trial court abused its 
discretion of this matter, it is necessary for 
Mr. Peck to show that the value of the property 
awarded to him was so disproportionate to the value of 
that awarded to Mrs. Peck as to evidence an abuse of 
discretion. Although Mr. Peck has attempted to make 
that showing in Point I of this brief, that showing is 
rendered more difficult and uncertain because of the 
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widely varying opinions as to the value of the 
properties. 
The second purpose of specific findings of fact 
in a divorce action is to provide a baseline from 
which future provisions for modification of the 
alimony or property distribution awards can be 
made. An example of this is in Hialey v. Hialev, 675 
P.2d 379 (Utah 1983). The trial court in that case 
had commented from the bench that the wife, who had 
significant medical problems, could probably work and 
support herself, but made no specific findings to that 
effect. The trial court made a small award of 
alimony, and the wife appealed. This court reversed 
the alimony award as too low, and also stated that a 
specific finding of fact as to the wife's ability to 
work and her income producing potential would be 
necessary to establish a baseline for possible future 
modifications. 676 P.2d at 382 n.l. 
It is very conceivable that either party to this 
action may subsequently petition the trial court for 
modification of the divorce decree. The modification 
could be either as to alimony or as to the property 
award. Chandler v. West. 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1980). 
It is well established that on a petition for 
modification the trial court must first determine 
whether there has been a change of circumstances. 
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Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982). As is set 
forth in Higley, supra, the trial court cannot 
determine whether there has been change in 
circumstances unless the initial divorce court has 
made a specific finding as to the circumstances at the 
time of the divorce. 
In addition to the trial court's failure to 
specifically find the value of the property owned by 
the parties, the court failed to make any finding as 
to the income producing potential of the husband. As 
in Higley, supra, the court here commented that it 
appeared that the husband could probably earn money, 
but failed to find how much money the husband or the 
wife could earn. The husband is therefore entitled to 
have this case remanded with instructions to the trial 
court to enter specific findings of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's property award should be 
reversed, and this case remanded with directions to 
make an equal division of the marital property. In 
the alternative, the case should be remanded with 
instructions that the trial court enter specific 
findings of fact and make such adjustments in the 
property as are warranted in light of the specific 
facts so found. 
L6 
DATED this $k+j^ day of December, 1984.-
K M . ^ -*-7 
S< REX LEW^S, for: 
HOWARD, L'£WIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing were mailed to the following/ postage 
prepaid/ this j*(Ak d aY o f December, 1984. 
Mr. Like Pappas 
Attorneys for Respondent 
23 South Carbon Avenue 
Price, UT 84501 
Secretary 
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APPENDIX A 
LUKE G. PAPPAS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
23 SOUTH CARBON AVENUE 
PRICE, UTAH 84501 
PHONE: 801/637-0177 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
UKIbJNAL 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
C A M OK COUNT Y.UTAH 
FILED 
m is m 
E0?«VJ,:N fttCHARS.CLERX 
Q at (T\j 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE B. PECK, 
Plaintiff; 
vs 
DONALD J. PECK, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No 14078 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the 
above entitled Court on the 19th day of April, 1984, the 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, presiding; and, 
the Plaintiff having appeared personally, and with her Counsel, 
Joane Pappas White on behalf of Luke G. Pappas; and, the Defendant 
having appeared personally and with his Counsel, S. Rex Lewis; 
and, the Court having heard sworn testimony and having been fully 
advised in the premises now finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident 
of Carbon County, State of Utah, and has been for more than three 
months immediately next prior to the commencement of this action. 
Page Two 
2. That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married on the 
16th day of September, 1950 at Elko County, Nevada and have 
been husband and wife since that time. 
3. That there have been five children born as the issue 
of this marriage, four of whom are still living and all of whom 
have attained their legal age of majority and are self-supporting. 
4. That the Defendant has treated the Plaintiff cruelly 
causing her great mental stress and suffering. 
5. That the parties hereto have accumulated substantial 
real and personal property during this thirty-four year marriage. 
That the Court is having difficulty in properly trying to 
distribute those assets because they are not liquid and nearly 
all of them are subject to debt that require monthly or annual 
payment in substantial amounts and the evidence does not disclose 
a viable source from which such payments can readily be made. 
The matter is further complicated in that the Court feels that 
the true value of Diana Corporation has not been fully disclosed 
nor has the income been taken from that company by the Defendant. 
It appears obvious that the Defendant is living off the income 
from the company but the evidence is lacking as to the extent 
of such draws or the availability of funds from which to order 
any direct payments or alimony payments. The only source of incoi 
to the parties at the time of the divorce hearing was the 
corporation which, over the years, has been the primary source 
of income along with the greenhouse business that has been depleti 
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to the point where more capital is going to have to be expended 
to make it a profitable concern. Taking in to consideration the 
exhibits introduced at trial and the difficulties outlined herein, 
the Court hereby finds that the real and personal property 
accumulated by the parties is awarded as follows: 
A. To the Plaintiff: 
1. The home of the parties located at the 
Junction of Highway #6 and the old Spring Glen Road together 
with all the real property surrounding said home, including any 
possible acquisition from the Utah State Road Department, subject 
to the debt and mortgage owed on said property which the Plaintiff 
is ordered to assume and pay and hold the Defendant harmless 
therefrom. Said property located in Carbon County, State of 
Utah, is more particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL I 
Beginning 175 8 f t . West of the Southeast 
Corner of the Northeast 1/4 Southeast 
1/4 of Section 36, Township 13 South 
Range 9 East , Sal t Lake Base and Meridian 
and running thence North 0°25f East 60 
f ee t ; East 308 f t . ; thence Southwesterly 
400 fee t to i n t e r s e c t i o n of the East 
r i g h t of way of highway; thence Nor theas ter ly 
along sa id r igh t of way 190 feet to point 
of beginning. Also, beginning South 1201.29 
feet and West 1421.87 feet of East 1/4 
Corner of Section 36; thence South 45°00f 
West 70.71 fee t ; thence West 248 f ee t , more 
or l e s s ; thence North 00°34f West 45 fee t ; 
thence North 08°28 f53" East 5.05 fee t ; 
thence East 298 f ee t , more or l e s s to point 
of beginning. 
Including a l l appurtenances and improvements 
the re to apper ta in ing . 
S& 
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2. All of the household furniture, fixtures, 
appliances and like household items now located in the home of 
the parties together with any bronze or antique items. 
3. The Swasey property together with all 
right, title and interest in the Dimitrich contract, provided 
that the Plaintiff assume any debts and obligations owing thereon 
and holding the Defendant harmless therefrom. Said Swasey 
property, located in Carbon County, State of Utah, is more 
particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL II 
Section 1, Township 14 South, Range 9 
East, SLB&M; SE 1/4 NW 1/4. Also, 
beginning 1320 feet South and 2640 feet 
West of the Northeast Corner of Section 
1; thence South 1320 feet; thence East 
520 feet; thence Northeasterly along West 
bank of canal to a point 570 feet East 
of beginning; thence West 570 feet to 
point of beginning. Also, beginning 
830 feet South and 1820 feet West of 
the Northeast corner of said Section 1; 
thence West 820 feet; thence South 
500 feet; thence East 570 feet; thence 
North 31° East 590 feet; thence North 
80 feet to point of beginning. 
Containing approximately 56.63 acres 
and including all appurtenances and 
improvements thereto appertaining. 
4. That Plaintiff is awarded the Miller Creek 
property, provided that she assume the outstanding indebtedness 
thereon and holds Defendant harmless therefrom. Said Miller 
Creek property located at Carbon County, State of Utah is 
more particularly described as follows: 
Page Five 
PARCEL I I I 
Beginning at the North 1/16 Corner of 
of Section 4 and Section 3 , 
Township 15 South, Range 10 East of 
SLB&M; sa id corner being marked with 
a 1/2 inch pipe in the ground; thence 
North 0°37 f30" West 50 feet to the point 
of beginning; thence South 89°28 f35n 
West 639.42 fee t ; thence North 0°45f 
West 12 34.82 fee t ; thence North 
89041'54" East 642.13 fee t along the 
North l i n e of the Section to the NE 
corner of Section 4; thence South 
0°37'30ff West 1232.32 feet along the 
East l i n e of Section 4 to the point of 
beginning. 
Containing approximately 17 acres and 
inc luding a l l improvements and appurtenances 
t he r e to apper ta in ing . 
5. That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the greenhouse 
business toge ther with a l l of i t s a l l r e l a t e d accessor ies 
including the 19 77 I n t e r n a t i o n a l dump t ruck . 
6. That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the 1983 Cadilac 
automobile provided tha t she assumes the outs tanding 
indebtedness thereon and holds the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
B. To the Defendant: 
1. All of the r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t in tha t 
Corporation known as Diana, Inc. subject to a l l indebtednesses 
owed on any of the equipment or owed by the company i t s e l f 
to any c r e d i t o r s , and upon which Defendant s h a l l hold P l a i n t i f f 
harmless. 
2. The 1979 GMC vehic le subject to any 
outs tanding indebtedness thereon provided tha t he holds the 
P l a i n t i f f harmless therefrom. 
©> 
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3. All of the personal items of proper ty 
in Defendants possession. 
C. The family annuity insurance pol icy through 
Travelers Insurance s h a l l remain in e f fec t in i t s current 
s t a t e and each of the p a r t i e s s h a l l remain the benef ic ia ry 
of the o ther . 
6. Since the corporation i s the only source of immediate 
income and have, based upon i t s p r i o r business record, the 
p o t e n t i a l of future income, the Court orders tha t the 
Defendant pay the P l a i n t i f f as and for alimony, the cash 
sum of $10,000.00, payable at the r a t e of $2,000.00 per year 
with the f i r s t payment due on or before December 31, 1984 and 
l i k e payments due on or before December 31 of each and every 
year t h e r e a f t e r u n t i l sa id cash sum has been paid in f u l l . 
This amount w i l l a s s i s t the P l a i n t i f f in r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g the 
greenhouse business so tha t she can be se l f - suppor t ing . 
7. The Court orders tha t each of the p a r t i e s here to pay 
t h e i r own costs and a t torneys f ee s . 
8. The Court previously entered a temporary order r equ i r ing 
the Defendant to pay to the P l a i n t i f f the sum of $1,500.00 per 
month as temporary alimony during the pendency of t h i s ac t ion . 
The Defendant made a Motion to vacate sa id order on the grounds 
tha t he did not have income in which to pay tha t amount. 
The Defendant did not personal ly appear, but appeared through 
Counsel a t the time the Court heard the o r i g i n a l Order To Show 
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Cause and the Court denied the Motion to vacate the temporary 
order but does alter its order to make it effective for 
the period of one month covering the period from the date of the 
Order To Show Cause on March 19, 1984, to the trial date 
on April 19, 1984. The Decree shall provide that Defendant 
shall pay the temporary alimony sum of $1,500.00 due under 
the temporary order to the Plaintiff within sixty (60) days 
from the date of this Decree. 
9. On the grounds that the parties have been separated 
for in excess of six months, the Court finds cause to waive 
the three month interlocutory waiting period so as to allow 
the Decree of Divorce issued in this case to become absolute 
and final upon its entry by the Clerk of the Court in 
the Registry of Actions. 
10. That the Plaintiff has sustained the allegations of 
her Complaint by adequate evidence. 
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact 
now concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the Defendant. 
2. That the property and debts accumulated by the parties 
during this marriage are awarded pursuant to paragraph five and 
subdivisions thereof of the Findings of Fact. 
3. That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff 
the case sum of $10,000.00 for and as alimony, payable at the 
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rate of $2,000.00 per year with the first payment due on or 
before December 31, 1984 and like payments due on or before 
December 31 of each and every year thereafter until said cash 
sum has been paid in full. This amount will assist the Plaintiff 
in re-establishing the greenhouse business so that she can be self 
supporting. 
4. That each parties is ordered to pay his or her 
respective court costs and attorneys fees in this matter. 
5. That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff 
the sum of $1,500.00 for and as temporary alimony due pursuant 
to the Order To Show Cause and to pay same to the Plaintiff 
within sixty (60) from the date of the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter. 
6. For good cause shown, the Court waives the subsequent 
three month interlocutory waiting period so as to allow the 
Decree of Divorce issued herein to become absolute and final 
upon its entry by the Clerk of Court in the Registry of Actions. 
DATED this/iTday of June, 1984. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
S. REX LEWIS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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APPENDIX B 
LUKE G. PAPPAS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
23 SOUTH CARBON AVENUE 
PRICE, UTAH 84501 
PHONE: 801/637-0177 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE B. PECK, : DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff; : 
VS : 
DONALD J. PECK, : 
Defendant. : Civil No. 14078 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the 
above entitled Court on the 19th day of April, 1984, the 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, presiding; and, 
the Plaintiff having appeared personally, and with her Counsel, 
Joane Pappas White on behalf of Luke G. Pappas; and, the Defendant 
having appeared personally and with his Counsel, S. Rex Lewis; 
and, the Court having heard sworn testimony and having been fully 
advised in the premises and having entered the foregoing Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff is granted a Divorce from Defendant. 
2. That the property accumulated by the parties during 
this marriage is awarded as follows: 
Ur\ivjmr\i-
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A. To the Plaintiff: 
1. The home of the parties located at the 
Junction of Highway #6 and the old Spring Glen Road together 
with all the real property surrounding said home, including any 
possible acquisition from the Utah State Road Department, subject 
to the debt and mortgage owed on said property which the Plaintiff 
is ordered to assume and pay and hold the Defendant harmless 
therefrom. Said property located in Carbon County, State of 
Utah, is more particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL I 
Beginning 1758 ft. West of the Southeast 
Corner of the Northeast 1/4 Southeast 
1/4 of Section 36, Township 13 South Range 
9 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
and running thence North 0°25f East 60 
feet; East 308 ft.; thence Southwesterly 
400 feet to intersection of the East 
right of way of highway; thence Northeasterly 
along said right of way 190 feet to point 
of beginning. Also, beginning South 1201.29 
feet and West 1421.87 feet to East 1/4 
Corner of Section 36; thence South 45°00T 
West 70.71 feet; thence West 248 feet, more 
or less; thence North 00°34f West 45 feet; 
thence North 08o28f53,f East 5.05 feet; 
thence East 298 feet, more or less to point 
of beginning. 
Including all appurtenances and improvements 
thereto appertaining. 
2. All of the household furniture, fixtures, 
appliances and like household items now located in the home of 
the parties together with any bronze or antique items. 
® 
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3. The Swasey property together with all 
right, title and interest in the Dimitrich contract, provided 
that the Plaintiff assume any debts and obligations owing thereon 
and holding the Defendant harmless therefrom. Said Swasey 
property, located in Carbon County, State of Utah, is more 
particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL II 
Section 1, Township 14 South, Range 9 
East, SLB&M: SE 1/4 NW 1/4. Also, 
beginning 1320 feet South and 2640 feet 
West of the Northeast Corner of Section 
1; thence South 1320 feet; thence 520 
feet; thence Northeasterly along west 
bank of canal to a point 570 feet Eafet of 
point of beginning; thence West 570 feet to 
point of beginning. Also, beginning 
830 feet South and 1820 feet West of 
the Northeast corner of said Section 1; 
thence West 820 feet; thence South 
500 feet; thence East 570 feet feet; thence 
North 31° East 590 feet; thence North 
80 feet to point of beginning. 
Containing approximately 56.63 acres and 
including all appurtenances and improvements 
thereto appertaining. 
4. That Plaintiff is awarded the Miller Creek 
property, provided that she assume the outstanding indebtedness 
thereon and holds Defendant harmless therefrom. Said Miller 
Creek property located at Carbon County, State of Utah is more 
particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL III 
Beginning a t t he North!/16 Corner of 
S e c t i o n 4 and Sec t ion 3 , 
Township 15 South, Range 10 Eas t of 
SLB&M; s a i d corner b e i n g marked wi th 
a 1/2 inch p ipe in t h e ground; thence 
North 0 ° 3 7 f 3 0 " West 50 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t 
of b e g i n n i n g ; thence South 89°28 f 35" 
West 639.42 f e e t ; thence North 0°45 ' 
m 
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West 1234.82 fee t ; thence North 
89"41 f54" East 642.13 feet along the 
North l ine of the Section to the NE 
corner of Section 4; thence South 
0o37 t30 f f West 1232.32 feet along the 
East l i n e of Section 4 to the point of 
beginning. 
Containing approximately 17 acres and 
including a l l improvements and appurtenances 
the re to apper ta in ing , subject to reservations and 
rights-of- way of Record. 
5. That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the greenhouse 
business toge ther with a l l of i t s a l l r e l a t e d accessor ies 
inc luding the 19 77 I n t e r n a t i o n a l dump truck. 
6. That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the 1983 Cadilac 
automobile provided tha t she assume the outs tanding 
indebtedness thereon and holds the Defendant harmless therefrom. 
B. To the Defendant: 
1. All of the r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t in tha t 
Corporation known as Diana, Inc . subject to a l l indebtednesses 
owed on any of the equipment or owed by the company i t s e l f 
to any c r e d i t o r s , and upon which Defendant s h a l l hold P l a i n t i f f 
harmless . 
2 . That 1979 GMC vehic le subject to any 
outs tanding indebtedness thereon provided tha t he holds the 
P l a i n t i f f harmless therefrom. 
3. All of the personal items of property in 
Defendants possess ion. 
3. That the Defendant i s ordered to pay to the P l a i n t i f f 
the sum of $10,000.00 as a lump sum cash alimony payment, 
payable a t the r a t e of $2,000.00 per year with the f i r s t 
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p yment due on or before December 31, 1984 and like payments 
due on or before December 31 of each and every year thereafter 
until said cash sum has been paid in full. This amount will 
assist the Plaintiff in re-establishing the greenhouse business 
so that she can be self-supporting. 
4. Each party is hereby ordered to pay his or his 
respective court costs and attorneys fees in this matter, 
5. That Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff 
the sum of $1,500.00 pursuant to the temporary alimony order 
and to pay said amount to the Plaintiff within sixty (60) days 
from the date hereof. 
6. For good cause shown, the Court waives the three 
month interlocutory waiting period so as to allow this Decree 
of Divorce to become absolute and final upon entry by the 
Clerk of Court in the Registry of Actions. 
7. The family annuity insurance policy through 
Travelers Insurance shall remain in effect in its current 
state and each of the parties shall remain the beneficiary 
of the other. 
DATED this ^ $day of June, 19 84. 
COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT 
S. REX LEWIS 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
® 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce to S. Rex Lewis, of HOWARD, LEWIS, 
& PETERSEN, Attorneys for Defendant, 120 East 300 North 
Street, P.O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84603 this ^ d a y of June, 
1984
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